OSPN — OneSpan Inc. · 2026-09-10 · Verdict: WATCH · Conviction 3
Price $16.10 (screen row, QUALITY.md build dated 2026-09-10; no live price) · Mkt cap $592.2M · EV $553.9M · EV/normalised after-tax profit 16.8x · FCF yield 6.8% · Net cash $38.3M · ADV $5.9M Sources read: 10-K 2026-02-26 (Items 1, 1A, 7), 10-Q 2026-08-04, DEF 14A 2026-04-23, 8-Ks 2026-04-30, 2026-05-11, 2026-06-05, 2026-08-04, Form 4s (12m to 2026-09-08), Q2 2026 earnings call transcript (call held 2026-08-04).
Desk stats
- Revenue trend. FY2025 revenue $243.180M against $243.179M in FY2024, flat, and flat only because currency added $3.7M; constant currency it fell about 1.5% (10-K, Item 7). Q2 2026 revenue $60.466M, up 1.0%, $0.6M of that currency (10-Q). Mix is the story: Digital Agreements up 25.2% to $19.538M, Cybersecurity down 7.5% to $40.928M on lower Digipass hardware volumes. Roughly $2M of the Digital Agreements increase was contract overage above the prior year, so ex-overage growth was 11.3% (Q2 call, CFO).
- Normalised after-tax operating profit. LTM GAAP operating income $44.316M (FY2025 $48.446M plus H1 2026 $23.558M less H1 2025 $27.688M). Add back restructuring of $1.523M (FY2025 $2.057M, H1 2025 $0.534M, H1 2026 nil); the plan terminated 2025-12-31, so it is finished (10-K, Item 7). Deduct $2.0M of above-run-rate overage, since the CFO puts the normal full-year overage run rate at $1.0M to $1.5M and says H2 will be "much less" (Q2 call). I decline management's add-back of $6.812M of LTM acquisition and "non-recurring project" fees: $4.2M in 2024, $5.9M in 2025, $2.5M in H1 2026, against a CEO who says targeted M&A continues. Normalised operating profit $43.8M versus $44.3M GAAP; at 25% tax, $32.9M.
- EV / normalised after-tax profit. EV $553.9M (36,783,000 shares at $16.10 = $592.2M, plus the $5.0M drawn revolver, less $43.337M cash, at 2026-06-30) over $32.9M = 16.8x. Leave the overage in and it is 16.1x. On FY2026 guidance it is 18.3x: the $69M adjusted EBITDA midpoint less about $14M of D&A, $11.5M of long-term incentive compensation and $3.5M of deal fees implies roughly $40M of GAAP operating income.
- Leverage. Net cash $38.3M. Total debt is a $5.0M draw on a $100.0M facility maturing 2030-06-23 (10-Q). Net debt to normalised EBITDA of about $55.9M is negative 0.7x.
- Is the growth sustainable? Partly bought and not currently cash-backed. ARR of $189.7M at 30 June is up 6.7% but includes Build38 (closed February 2026) and $1.4M of currency, and it fell sequentially from $192.1M at 31 March (8-K 2026-04-30; 10-Q). H1 operating cash flow was $28.1M against $35.6M. Revenue guidance was raised; profit guidance implies a decline.
- What the screen got wrong. It priced CY2025 GAAP EBIT of $48.446M against a June 2026 balance sheet, so 15.3x should be 16.1x to 16.8x. Its growth gate is passed on a number that has already reversed: normalised EBIT "+8.1%" is FY2025 over FY2024, while Q1 2026 operating income fell 14%, Q2 fell 17%, and FY2026 adjusted EBITDA is guided to $67M to $71M against $77.649M actual. And 8.5% FCF yield is FY2025; LTM free cash flow is $40.1M for 6.8%, because capex plus capitalised software nearly doubled to $6.420M in H1 2026 from $3.488M. It was right on net cash and right that no impairment is masking anything.
1. What the business actually does
OneSpan sells authentication and digital agreement software, mostly to banks; more than 60% of the world's 100 largest banks are customers (10-K, Item 1). Cybersecurity (73% of revenue) is passkeys, FIDO2, transaction signing, mobile app shielding and the legacy Digipass hardware tokens. Digital Agreements (27%) is OneSpan Sign, a white-labelled e-signature and identity verification product sold into regulated industries against Docusign and Adobe. The structural fact is that Digipass fell from 78% of revenue in 2015 to 20% in 2025, and everything management does is an attempt to grow software faster than that runs off. Top 10 customers are 18% of revenue.
2. Why it is mispriced: the edge case
There is none, which caps this at WATCH. The stock is 4.1% off its 52-week high after a 53% six-month run, trades $5.9M a day, drew questions from five sell-side analysts on the Q2 call, and is institutionally held with no controlling holder: BlackRock 10.0%, Legal and General 5.6%, Ameriprise 5.5%, all officers and directors together 2.0% (DEF 14A). Nobody is selling this for a non-economic reason.
3. Unit economics and growth
The quality is real; the trajectory is not. Gross margin went 72% to 74% between FY2024 and FY2025 on software mix, and subscription is now 77% of revenue against 70% a year ago (10-K, Item 7; Q2 release). Normalised return on invested capital is about 14%, and about 36% excluding $143.1M of goodwill and intangibles. But retention is mediocre for software: net retention was 104% at end-2025 against 106% a year earlier (10-K) and 103% at 30 June, with gross retention of 86% in Cybersecurity and 93% in Digital Agreements (Q2 call, CFO). Cybersecurity operating income fell 30% in Q2 to $13.819M as acquired headcount and go-to-market hires landed on a shrinking revenue base (10-Q). Digital Agreements operating income more than doubled to $6.972M, but on overage revenue that is excluded from ARR and will not repeat at that level. EMEA, 42% of revenue, fell 5% in FY2025 and 9% in H1 2026.
4. Balance sheet and capital allocation
Clean. Cash $43.3M, one $5.0M revolver draw, nothing maturing before 2030, $8.4M of operating leases and $11.9M of purchase obligations (10-K, Item 7). Shares went 37,361k to 36,783k in six months, about 4% lower year over year. The board terminated the old buyback on 2026-05-07 and authorised $50M through 2028, of which at most $2.9M was used by 30 June (8-K 2026-05-11). The dividend is $0.13 quarterly, a 3.2% yield, covered about twice by free cash flow. One caution: $59.2M of the $273.5M equity is a deferred tax asset from released valuation allowances, and FY2025 net income of $72.904M exceeds operating income only because of a $23.542M tax benefit, so the headline P/E is meaningless.
5. Management: said versus did
Guidance was raised twice in 2026 (8-Ks 2026-04-30, 2026-08-04), and honestly attributed: e-signature overages and hardware bookings pulled forward, not underlying demand. Against that, the 2025 Management Incentive Program paid 25% of target and the 2025 performance share units earned 37.5% of target, after which the committee awarded discretionary cash bonuses anyway, $175,000 to the CEO and $83,000 to the CFO (DEF 14A). The CEO's special grant vests on 45-day VWAP goals of $18, $20 and $22, the $18 already certified, which aligns him with a re-rating or a sale. Insiders sold 35,000 shares for $443,978 in twelve months and bought nothing (Form 4s).
6. Valuation
Base (50%): FY2027 revenue $262M, up 5%, operating margin recovering to 17.5% as deal costs fade, $34.4M after tax at 18x plus net cash gives $18.20. Bear (30%): Cybersecurity software fails to offset hardware, Digital Agreements normalises to 5% without overages, margin stays at 15%, 13x gives $10.85. Bull (20%): DigipassONE cross-sell lifts net retention toward 110%, revenue grows 9% at a 20% margin on 21x, or a bid inside the CEO's $20 to $22 change-of-control schedule, gives $24.90. Probability-weighted $17.34 against $16.10, an 8% spread. Reverse DCF: at a 9% cost of capital the price implies about 2.9% perpetual growth on trailing normalised profit and 3.4% on this year's guided profit.
7. Catalysts and timeline
The Q3 print in late October or early November, the seasonally weakest hardware quarter with H2 overages guided lower; the Q4 print and first FY2027 guidance in late February 2027; and European digital identity wallet specifications due end of 2026 with banks required to accept wallets by end of 2027, which is what the DigipassONE Verify proofs of concept running now target (Q2 call, CEO).
8. Kill criteria
- ARR below $194M at 2026-12-31, the bottom of guidance, or a second consecutive sequential ARR decline after the $192.1M to $189.7M fall in Q2.
- Cybersecurity gross retention below 85% in two consecutive quarters, against 86% in Q2 2026.
- FY2027 adjusted EBITDA guided below $70M in late February, which would be two straight years of falling profit on rising revenue.
- Net insider selling above $1M over any trailing twelve months with still no open-market purchases, against $443,978 sold today.
9. Verdict and summary
WATCH, conviction 3. OneSpan is a genuinely good little business, 74% gross margin, 77% subscription, net cash, a 3.2% dividend and a 4% lower share count, priced at 16.8x normalised after-tax operating profit once you move off the screen's stale CY2025 earnings and decline management's add-back of acquisition fees that have recurred three years running. The trouble is that the screen's growth gate looks backwards. Revenue was flat in FY2025 and is positive in FY2026 only because of currency, overages the CFO says will not repeat, and two acquisitions, while profit goes the other way: operating income down 14% in Q1 and 17% in Q2, with full-year adjusted EBITDA guided to $67M to $71M against $77.6M delivered in 2025, which puts the forward multiple nearer 18x. ARR fell sequentially in Q2 and Cybersecurity gross retention is 86%. There is no edge case, no artifact, no forced seller and no discount: the stock is 4% off its high after a 53% six-month run, and the price already implies about 3% perpetual growth, roughly what management guides to. What would change it is evidence that the 2026 spending buys 2027 growth, and that arrives in two places, the DigipassONE Verify proofs of concept against the European wallet mandate and the first FY2027 guide in February.
Research for discussion, not investment advice. Positions and sizing are the reader's decision.