EPAC — Enerpac Tool Group Corp · 2026-09-10 · Verdict: WATCH · Conviction 2
Price $36.41 (screen row, priced as of the 2026-09-10 v2 screen run; no live quote) · Mkt cap $1,862M · EV $1,931M · EV/normalised after-tax operating profit 20.0x · FCF yield 4.9% · Net debt $69M · ADV $11M Sources read: 10-K 2025-10-17 (Items 1, 1A, 7), 10-Q 2026-07-09, DEF 14A 2025-12-22, 8-Ks 2026-03-25, 2026-07-08, 2026-07-09, 2026-07-23, Form 4s (12m). Enerpac files no prepared remarks or call transcript as an exhibit, so section 5 works from the releases and proxy, not from a call.
Desk stats
- Revenue trend. FY2025 (to 31 Aug 2025) sales $617M, up 4.6% on $590M: DTA acquisition $20M (3 points), FX $2M (1 point), organic about 1% (10-K 2025, Item 7). Q3 FY2026 sales $167.6M, up 5.6%, of which FX 2 points and organic 3%: IT&S product organic +5%, IT&S service organic -8% (8-K 2026-07-08).
- Normalised after-tax operating profit. GAAP operating profit for the twelve months to 31 May 2026 was $134.7M ($39.8M + $28.5M + $25.0M + $41.4M; 8-K 2026-07-08 supplemental). The one genuinely non-recurring item is a subtraction: the $5.7M net benefit from the expected refund of IEEPA tariffs struck down in February 2026, worth $0.08 of Q3's $0.60 adjusted EPS. I do not add back the $3.3M restructuring or $3.1M M&A charges the company adds back, because restructuring was charged in FY2023 ($7M), FY2024 ($7M), FY2025 ($6M) and FY2026 to date ($3M) (10-K 2025, Item 7). Normalised operating profit $129.0M against GAAP $134.7M; at 25% tax, $96.8M.
- EV / normalised after-tax profit: 20.0x. From the 31 May 2026 balance sheet: 51.14M shares at $36.41 = $1,862M, plus $10.0M current maturities and $174.8M long-term debt, less $115.7M cash = $1,931M. No converts.
- Leverage. Net debt $69.1M on normalised adjusted EBITDA of $151.0M (TTM $156.7M less the tariff benefit) = 0.46x; the company reports 0.5x on its credit-agreement definition. Pro forma for the pending SFE purchase, net debt is about $520M, or 3.4x standalone EBITDA before any SFE contribution.
- Is the growth sustainable? Mostly bought and translated rather than earned: about 1% organic in FY2025 and in the first nine months of FY2026, cash-backed but guided down twice this year.
- What the screen got wrong. It missed the 7 July 2026 agreement to buy Specialized Fabrication Equipment Group for $451.4M cash plus $20.6M of RSUs and the revolver increase from $400M to $625M (8-K 2026-07-09), 23% of EV, entirely absent. It did not strip the $5.7M tariff refund flattering the latest quarter. And its "+4.6% FY, +5.6% last quarter" reads as growth where the filings show about 1% organic, with service down 18% organically year to date.
1. What the business actually does
Enerpac makes high-pressure hydraulic and mechanical tools (cylinders, pumps, torque wrenches, bolt tensioners, heavy-lift positioning systems running at 5,000 to 12,000 psi) sold through a global distributor network into refining and petrochemical, general industrial, MRO, machining, power generation, infrastructure and mining (10-K 2025, Item 1). It also sells bolting and joint-integrity manpower services and tool rental. Manufacturing is "primarily light assembly of components we source from a network of global suppliers," which is why gross margin runs at 51% and capex at 2-3% of sales. One reportable segment, IT&S, plus Cortland Biomedical. Sales split 37% United States, 28% Europe, 13% Middle East, 11% Asia. Founded 1910, Milwaukee.
2. Why it is mispriced: the edge case
There is none I can identify, and that caps the verdict. EPAC is an NYSE-listed $1.9B company with $11M of daily volume, sell-side coverage, no spin-off, no index event, no forced seller, no founder transition. It sits 16% below its 52-week high and is flat over six months. It surfaced at rank 62 on the screen not because something is hidden but because the screen's growth inputs flatter a company growing about 1% organically. The only genuinely undisclosed thing is SFE Group, which is an unpriced unknown, not a discovered bargain.
3. Unit economics and growth
The quality is real. Gross margin was 51% in FY2025 and FY2024, up from 49% in FY2023 (10-K 2025, Item 7). IT&S adjusted operating margin was 28.0% in FY2025 and 30.3% in Q3 FY2026; segment adjusted EBITDA margin 29.9% in FY2025 (8-K 2026-07-08). Normalised after-tax ROIC, $96.8M over $424M equity plus $69M net debt, is 19.6%, and much higher excluding the $334M of goodwill and intangibles on an $812M balance sheet. FY2025 CFO of $111M less $19M capex gave $92M of free cash flow, and FY2026 free cash flow guidance of $100-110M survived two guidance cuts.
The problem is the top line and now the margin. IT&S service revenue fell 26%, 17% and 8% organically in Q1-Q3 FY2026, down 18% for the nine months, on EMEA weakness and Middle East conflict. Product organic growth of 5% has not offset it: nine-month operating profit was $94.9M against $93.6M, up 1.3%. Adjusted EBITDA margin was 22.4% and 21.3% in Q1 and Q2 against 24.9% for FY2025, reaching 28.0% in Q3 only with the tariff refund inside it. Revised FY2026 adjusted EBITDA guidance of $151-156M brackets FY2025's actual $153.6M: flat EBITDA on 4% higher revenue. Distributor dependence, not customer concentration, is the named channel risk (10-K 2025, Item 1A).
4. Balance sheet and capital allocation
Clean until July. The $600M September 2022 facility matures September 2027; there were no revolver borrowings at 31 May 2026 and all covenants were met (10-Q 2026-07-09). Buybacks were aggressive: $81.1M in the first nine months of FY2026 against $28.6M a year earlier, cutting diluted share count from 54.7M to 52.4M, with $120M of the $200M October 2025 authorisation left. That capital now has a competing claim. Insiders made no open-market purchases in twelve months; the only sales were two directors exercising options and selling 2,930 shares each at $34.35, about $201K net (Form 4s, 2026-07-27). One real alignment feature: three SFE executives must escrow part of their proceeds to buy EPAC shares in the market, locked three years (8-K 2026-07-09).
5. Management: what they said versus what they did
Paul Sternlieb has been CEO since October 2021 and completed the $75M ASCEND programme in FY2024, which did lift gross margin from 49% to 51%. Against that, FY2026 guidance was cut twice (adjusted EBITDA from $158-163M to $151-156M, organic growth from 1-3% to 1-2%; 8-Ks 2026-03-25, 2026-07-08) while free cash flow guidance held at $100-110M although nine-month free cash flow is $60M. Pay is where I would push back. FY2025 bonuses paid at 100.7% of target although organic growth of 1.0% missed the 2.0% target, adjusted EBITDA of $161.4M missed $166.9M and margin of 26.4% missed 26.9%; free cash flow conversion of 106.5% against a 100% target paid 183% and carried the blend (DEF 14A 2025-12-22). That committee EBITDA of $161.4M is also $7.8M above the $153.6M in the earnings release.
6. Valuation
EV of $1,931M on $96.8M of normalised after-tax operating profit is a 5.0% yield. Reverse DCF: at a 9% cost of capital the price implies about 4% perpetual growth in after-tax operating profit, against roughly 1% organic revenue growth in each of the last two fiscal years. Base (50%): 2% organic growth, margins hold, FY2027 NOPAT near $101M at 18x gives about $34. Bull (25%): SFE was bought near 8x EBITDA, adds $55-60M of EBITDA growing double digits, service stabilises, FY2028 NOPAT $140M at 19x with net debt down to $400M gives about $44. Bear (25%): service keeps shrinking, no tariff repeat, the deal closes into a soft cycle at 3.4x leverage and the multiple compresses to 14x on $105M of NOPAT, about $19. Weighted, roughly $33 against $36.41. The SFE assumptions are explicitly unverified: SFE Group's revenue and EBITDA appear nowhere in any filing in this bundle, so the $451.4M price cannot be converted into a multiple today.
7. Catalysts and timeline
Q4 FY2026 results and first FY2027 guidance, roughly October 2026. Deal close expected Q1 FY2027, no earlier than 1 September 2026, outside date 1 November 2026 extendable to 31 December 2026, subject to HSR, UK CMA and French and German foreign-investment clearances (8-K 2026-07-09). Most important, the Form 8-K/A carrying SFE Group's audited financials, which the merger agreement obliges SFE to prepare for filing after closing.
8. Risks and pre-registered kill criteria
Company-specific rather than boilerplate: dependence on independent distributors and agents, where losing one in a key market could inhibit marketing; $337M of goodwill and intangibles at 41% of total assets; oil and gas plus Middle East exposure, already visible in the service decline (10-K 2025, Item 1A).
- SFE Group's post-close audited financials imply above 12x EBITDA, that is SFE EBITDA below about $38M on $451.4M of cash consideration.
- IT&S service revenue declines organically for two more consecutive quarters after Q4 FY2026, against management's stated expectation of sequential improvement.
- Consolidated adjusted EBITDA margin below 23% for two consecutive quarters post-close.
- Pro forma net debt to adjusted EBITDA above 3.0x two quarters after closing with the $120M buyback authorisation still untouched.
9. Verdict and one-paragraph summary
WATCH, conviction 2. Enerpac is a genuinely good business, with 51% gross margin, 28% segment EBITDA margin, 20% after-tax ROIC, light capex and a 1910 brand in mission-critical tools, that is not on sale. At 20.0x normalised after-tax operating profit the price implies about 4% perpetual profit growth while the company delivers about 1% organic revenue growth, has cut FY2026 guidance twice, guides adjusted EBITDA flat to down on 4% higher revenue, and had its best recent quarter flattered by a $5.7M one-time tariff refund. What the screen missed is decisive: eight weeks before the screen ran, Enerpac agreed to spend $451.4M in cash, 23% of enterprise value, on SFE Group and raised its revolver to $625M, taking net debt from 0.5x to about 3.4x standalone EBITDA, and no available filing discloses what SFE earns. This is a well-run compounder attempting a transformational acquisition on undisclosed terms; the right response is to wait for the 8-K/A with SFE's audited numbers rather than underwrite the deal blind at a full multiple.
Research for discussion, not investment advice. Positions and sizing are the reader's decision.